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uncertainty about the effect of groups in the policy process, 
and they point to the large-scale interest group surveys of the 
1980s as promising examples. 
Yet, this answer overlooks the fundamental problem in 
determining the role of groups in the policy process, namely, 
the failure to construct counterfactuals that can establish 
causal links between the actions of groups and the various 
outcomes in the policy process that groups strive to influence, 
such as agendas, issue interpretations, the content of policy 
options, the decisions of public officials, and the implemen- 
tation and enforcement of approved policies. Broadening the 
empirical scope of influence studies and paying greater 
attention to context are not necessarily going to lead to the 
construction of more successful counterfactuals. Indeed, they 
are likely to make the construction even more difficult by 
significantly increasing the amount of data that must be 
collected. 
Constructing convincing counterfactuals requires the col- 
lection of substantial information about the strategies, re- 
sources, and positions of all who are involved in the policy (or 
policies) under investigation, and some of this information is 
extremely difficult to gather. Indeed, the practice in recent 
decades of narrowing the scope of empirical investigations of 
group influence is a direct result of scholars trying to manage 
the data collection effort. Broadening the empirical scope of 
such studies may be necessary, but it will require a level of 
scholarly effort and financial support that is beyond anything 
attempted so far in the study of interest groups. 
Despite the lack of attention to the counterfactuals, Basic 
Interests is still an excellent guide to where the literature has 
advanced and where it has not. It assumes, however, that the 
reader is familiar with much of the literature being reviewed 
and does not go into great detail about any particular theory 
or body of work. Therefore, it is not appropriate for intro- 
ductory undergraduate courses, but it is an excellent refer- 
ence for all faculty who teach courses in interest groups and 
American politics. It is also appropriate for advanced under- 
graduate and graduate courses with a strong emphasis on 
interest groups, as well as for undergraduate senior seminars 
and introductory scope and methods graduate courses with 
an emphasis on epistemological issues and the development 
of political science as a science. 
Mistaken Identity: The Supreme Court and the Politics of 
Minority Representation. By Keith J. Bybee. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 194p. $55.00. 
J. Morgan Kousser, California Institute of Technology 
In a series of contentious, confusing, and contradictory 
opinions beginning with Shaw v. Reno (1993), the Supreme 
Court has outlawed some but not all congressional and state 
legislative districts that were designed to ensure that African- 
American and Latino voters had genuine opportunities to 
elect candidates of their choice. Citing only Supreme Court 
opinions and a small part of the huge secondary literature on 
voting rights and redistricting, Keith Bybee claims that, in 
voting rights cases, "conservatives" and "progressives" have 
fundamentally struggled over the definition of "who 'the 
people' are" (p. 7), but his own analysis and prescriptions are 
not persuasive. He too readily dismisses or ignores empirical 
scholarship, disregards many Supreme and lower court opin- 
ions that do not fit his scheme, and provides no justification 
in logic or constitutional law for his key proposal. 
Since 1993, Bybee maintains, the five-person majority of 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and justices Anthony 
Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Clar- 
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ence Thomas has consistently adopted an individualist notion 
of political identity, while the four-person dissenting minority 
of Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and 
John Paul Stevens (and Harry Blackmun and Bryon White 
before their retirement) has consistently considered political 
identity to be group based. Instead, Bybee urges the Court to 
base its jurisprudence on the idea of "political deliberation," 
a basis that he believes will tend to reunite the fractured 
public and strengthen the role of the Court itself. In less 
exalted terms, he opposes the actual or effective repeal of 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which under Thornburg v. 
Gingles (1986) protects large, geographically compact minor- 
ities against repeated defeats by white majorities in racially 
polarized elections. This would guarantee diversity in legis- 
lative membership, he contends. To encourage deliberation, 
he would have the Court force redistricting to be bipartisan. 
A political theorist, Bybee scorns those who believe de- 
bates may turn on "simple matters of fact," who support their 
arguments with "an immense amount of historical detail," or 
who reduce complexities to "a few bits of numerical data" 
(pp. 63, 43, 55). Empiricists such as Justice Byron White or 
political scientist Bernard Grofman, who employ qualitative 
or quantitative evidence to determine the intent or effect of 
electoral laws on minority representation, Bybee announces, 
are guilty of "evasion of theoretical issues" or "evasion of 
conceptual issues" (pp. 60, 115). In contrast, Bybee neither 
analyzes data himself nor evaluates the conflicting empirical 
literature on disputed topics. Rather, he merely adopts 
convenient assumptions about reality: Political identity, he 
asserts, "develops during the process of debate and discus- 
sion, making it possible for decisions to be made in the 
common interest" (p. 171). Bipartisan redistricting "loosens 
incumbents' grip on their constituencies and keeps the legis- 
lature responsive to the electorate as a whole. Through 
conflict and counterargument, policy is made in the common 
interests of all" (p. 169). 
Bybee's selective treatment of legal cases undermines his 
statements about the nature and consequences of Supreme 
Court opinions. His contention that Mobile v. Bolden (1980) 
showed "the search for discriminatory intent in the design of 
political institutions was likely to be fruitless" (p. 23), for 
example, is weakened by the fact that the plaintiffs success- 
fully proved such an intent when the case was remanded to 
the district court. His description of the Supreme Court as a 
representative of "the people as a whole" (p. 37) ignores the 
body's self-conscious role after the famous footnote 4 of 
United States v. Carotene Products (1938) as the special 
guardian of the rights of "discrete and insular minorities," as 
well as its more common historical role as the guardian of 
majority persecution of those minorities in such cases as Dred 
Scott v. Sandford (1857) and Korematsu v. United States 
(1944). Bybee's declaration that group and individual con- 
ceptions of rights form the central issue and dividing line in 
voting rights cases is undercut by the existence of other 
dividing lines (intent versus effect; symbolic versus real harm; 
descriptive representation versus influence; judicial activism 
versus deference to Congress, the Department of Justice, or 
state legislatures), none of which is discussed systematically, 
as well as by the inconsistency with which both sides have 
held to the group and individual conceptions. 
In Shaw v. Reno, for example, Justice O'Connor, an 
individualist in Bybee's scheme, posits three symbolic or 
"expressive" harms to "our society" that ungainly minority 
opportunity districts may produce: stereotyping, exacerbating 
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racially polarized voting, and cuing representatives to be 
attentive to only one group in a district. Because, as she 
notes, redistricting "does not classify persons at all; it classi- 
fies tracts of land, or addresses," none of these three alleged 
harms, which are crucial to her opinion, is really based, on an 
individualized notion of political identity. In Davis v. Bande- 
mer (1986), the case in which the Court ruled partisan 
gerrymandering justiciable and which Bybee, surprisingly, 
does not discuss, O'Connor would have denied the Demo- 
crats standing to sue because, unlike "racial minority 
groups," they "cannot claim that they are a discrete and 
insular group vulnerable to exclusion from the political 
process by some dominant group." Since at least the 1840s, 
during the first Boston school integration struggle, racial 
progressives have condemned irrational distinctions that 
harm individuals and the use of what Justice Thurgood 
Marshall later called "crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes" 
(Batson v. Kentucky [1986]). 
Bybee derives his "political deliberation" theme from his 
speculative extension of Chief Justice Earl Warren's discus- 
sion in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966) of the care with 
which Congress considered the initial Voting Rights Act. 
Warren, Bybee says, "seemed to suggest" that jurisdictions 
which were required to submit changes in their electoral laws 
to Congress before putting them into effect should conduct 
"Congress-like deliberations," should "deliberate on behalf 
of the entire people" (pp. 85, 155). But Warren did not say 
this, the Department of Justice has never mandated it, and 
the bargaining over election laws and redistricting seldom 
resembles the "nondiscriminatory deliberation ... broad leg- 
islative learning" that Bybee imagines (p. 87). 
Even granting the possibility of "deliberation about the 
interests that all hold in common as well as the policies best 
suited to serve those interests" (p. 154), the logical connec- 
tions between this utopia and race-conscious and bipartisan 
redistricting are unclear. Mandatory bipartisan gerrymanders 
may reduce minority influence and representation, and cross- 
party redistricting deals or minority representation may 
inhibit, rather than foster, a polite search for legislative 
consensus. These are empirical questions that Bybee does not 
pursue. Curiously, in a book on constitutional law, Bybee 
makes no effort to tie bipartisanship or deliberation to any 
constitutional phrase, doctrine, or theory. Is the Constitution 
a mandate for the majority of the Supreme Court to institute 
any political notion it fancies? 
The Color Bind: California's Battle to End Affirmative 
Action. By Lydia Chavez. Berkeley: University of Califor- 
nia Press, 1998. 305p. $40.00 cloth, $13.56 paper. 
Caroline J. Tolbert, Kent State University 
Racial/ethnic diversity is a defining feature of U.S. politics, 
especially in California, the most ethnically diverse of the fifty 
states. At the same time, "direct democracy" has become 
increasingly important to both scholars and policymakers. 
California has historically been a leader -in the use of the 
initiative process, which allows citizens to petition to place 
policy questions directly on the statewide ballot for a popular 
vote. Indeed, the connection between demographic change 
and the increased interest in direct democracy is probably not 
coincidental. Scholarly and popular literature suggests the 
availability of the initiative process combined with high 
racial/ethnic diversity has fueled a white backlash in Califor- 
nia politics (Peter Schrag, Paradise Lost: California's Experi- 
ence, America's Future, 1998). This is a central question for 
readers of Lydia Chavez's book. 
As are other recent books on direct democracy, The Color 
Bind is extremely well written. It focuses on the 1996 passage 
of the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI), Proposition 
209, which ended affirmative action programs in government 
employment, contracts, and college admissions. Most current 
research on direct democracy focuses on policy outcomes or 
initiative voting, but Chavez, as does Daniel Smith (Tax 
Crusaders and the Politics of Direct Democracy, 1998), shows 
us the process behind initiative campaigns. By tracing the 
evolution of Proposition 209-motivations of the sponsors, 
drafting the language of the constitutional amendment, the 
petition phase and collection of a million signatures, and the 
general election campaign-the book provides an excellent 
case study in how initiative politics actually work. 
The author draws on extensive interviews with hundreds of 
individuals. With the objectivity and even-handedness of an 
experienced reporter, she pulls the curtain back to reveal the 
real politics-complicated, nasty, and often humorous-that 
surrounded one of the most important ballot measures of the 
decade. The November 1996 election, in which Proposition 
209 was on the ballot, was also a presidential election year. 
The book is the story of national party politics, presidential 
hopefuls, race, and gender intertwined with a state-level 
initiative campaign. Chavez's book elucidates the connection 
between candidate and issue elections, something not well 
understood by political scientists. 
The emphasis on process is evident in even the smallest 
details. In the first 123 pages of the book, the initiative is 
referred to by its formal title, the California Civil Rights 
Initiative (CCRI). On page 124 the initiative is christened by 
the Election Commission with a new title, Proposition 209, 
once it qualified for the general election ballot. This name 
change signals an important distinction between the two 
major phases in an initiative campaign: (1) the drafting and 
petition stage and (2) the general election campaign. Differ- 
ent actors, politics, and processes dominate the two stages. 
An important theme is the power of state ballot initiatives 
in setting the political agenda at the national level, even in a 
presidential election year. Chavez illustrates how the process 
can turn "personal opinions into law" (p. 81). In this case, the 
ideas of two academics from northern California, Custred 
and Wood, would become part of the state constitution. 
According to Chavez, the initiative process takes "complex 
policy issues-ones like abortion, gay rights, and civil rights 
that the courts and legislatures had tussled with for years- 
and puts them into the political arena where money and 
sound bites counted most" (p. 81). The process, however 
blunt, is an important catalyst for policy change, both pro- 
gressive and reactionary. 
As Chavez tells us (see also Paul Sniderman and Edward 
Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race, 1997, and Daniel Smith, 
Tax Crusaders, 1998), the case of Proposition 209 reveals the 
importance of framing and wording initiatives for their 
success at the ballot box. The measure's name, the California 
Civil Rights Initiative, appropriated the ideals of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and the 1960s civil rights movement. Not 
only were the sponsors important in drafting ballot language 
but also the attorney general of California, who has the sole 
authority to write the one-hundred word initiative title and 
summary, which are all that many voters read. The summary 
stated that Proposition 209 would prohibit local and state 
government entities from "discriminating against or giving 
preferential treatment" based on race, sex, ethnicity, or 
national origin. Nowhere did the title, summary, or text 
inform voters that the initiative would have any effect on 
affirmative action programs. State and national polls clearly 
showed that voters wanted to ban "preferential treatment," 
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